Posts tonen met het label encryptie. Alle posts tonen
Posts tonen met het label encryptie. Alle posts tonen

woensdag 30 mei 2012

De IT van een bank

Joris Luyendijk doet antropologisch veldwerk in The City in Londen en blogt over zijn observaties (Engels en Nederlands) Op het Engelstalige blog gaf hij gisteren de ervaringen van een "former IT-salesman"...
Het is nogal ontluisterend:
Global corporation X is storing all of its crucial data in encrypted form. To unlock the encryption you need special keys, which are stored in one central place, on one computer.
"We sold them that system assuring them it was safe. One Friday afternoon, a new employee at X needs some extra capacity and notices this one computer doing nothing. He thinks it's idling so he copies its contents to a temporary file, and lets the computer run whatever he needs it for. Then he tries to copy the contents back, which is impossible with encrypted files and this is how he discovers what he's done: he has effectively erased the system that underpins all of X's global operations. Their data are still there, but encrypted and the keys are lost.
"Panic ensues, and my colleagues who installed the software jump on the first plane to X's headquarters. There they discover just how lucky company X has been. The installation was relatively recent, so our people had a good grasp of its details. They went through the system and thank God, the switches had not yet been reset, meaning the keys could be retrieved. If X had rebooted its systems all would have been lost.
Over IT-problemen en hun oplossingen:
"I am sure your readers would be shocked if they realised just how crap IT has been organised in many banks as well as corporations and government ministries. Sometimes we get a glimpse, when a company is unavailable for days due to 'computer problems'. Have you noticed these cases always take longer than expected? This is not because repairs take long. Finding out what the problem is in the first place – 'root cause analysis' – that's nearly always the most time-consuming. Nobody has a complete and in-depth overview any longer.
Over outsourcing:
"Years ago management in major banks and corporations decided that they could outsource vital IT functions to companies such as IBM, Tata, HP and Atos Origin T-Systems. The idea was that if you describe the processes you require adequately, it's safe to delegate their execution to outsiders. But the first contract goes to IBM, two years later a contract for another part of the infrastructure is awarded to HP, then Cisco gets to manage the network … Now, who is responsible for the overall system? All systems need patches frequently. But before you install one, you need to make sure it doesn't do things you didn't expect. This requires cooperation between these suppliers, who will of course charge for these things. Often the various suppliers' support contracts don't match. Also, there is little continuity within those suppliers; operations are restructured, people get replaced or moved around. Vital expertise gets lost. Major suppliers do collaborate on patch management. But each has to 'certify' every upgrade, and since each works with a different 'software map', they come to different decisions on different timetables regarding certification. Often the latest software cannot be installed because one of the suppliers has not certified it.
Over de panacee, de CIO:
"Are so-called chief information officers, the top executives responsible for IT, aware of this? I very much doubt if they are and if they care. They are managers, skilled in office politics, not technical experts. Most CIOs rarely stay in their post more than a few years. I worked for one of the major software companies in the world. It took my boss a year and a half of begging and pleading with the secretary to get a meeting with the CIO of a major client. CEOs are worse. They are afraid of looking stupid or ignorant, and actively avoid their IT people.
En het ergste is natuurlijk: Het is o zo herkenbaar en geldt helaas ook allemaal voor overheidsorganisaties, klein EN groot!

Gerelateerd
Gelezen: Joris Luyendijk - Je hebt het niet van mij, maar...


Plaatje: Old Bank Vault - 003 van JasonBechtel

donderdag 29 maart 2012

NSA luistert mee en bewaart alles

1 Visitor control center - A $9.7 million facility for ensuring that only cleared personnel gain access.
2 Administration - Designated space for technical support and administrative personnel.
3 Data halls - Four 25,000-square-foot facilities house rows and rows of servers.
4 Backup generators and fuel tanks - Can power the center for at least three days.
5 Water storage and pumping - Able to pump 1.7 million gallons of liquid per day.
6 Chiller plant - About 60,000 tons of cooling equipment to keep servers from overheating.
7 Power substation - An electrical substation to meet the center’s estimated 65-megawatt demand.
8 Security - Video surveillance, intrusion detection, and other protection will cost more than $10 million.
Alleen al om de onthutsende omvang is het de moeite waard om het artikel uit Wired over het nieuwe datacenter en de toekomstplannen van de NSA te lezen:
The plans for the center show an extensive security system: an elaborate $10 million antiterrorism protection program, including a fence designed to stop a 15,000-pound vehicle traveling 50 miles per hour, closed-circuit cameras, a biometric identification system, a vehicle inspection facility, and a visitor-control center.
Inside, the facility will consist of four 25,000-square-foot halls filled with servers, complete with raised floor space for cables and storage. In addition, there will be more than 900,000 square feet for technical support and administration. The entire site will be self-sustaining, with fuel tanks large enough to power the backup generators for three days in an emergency, water storage with the capability of pumping 1.7 million gallons of liquid per day, as well as a sewage system and massive air-conditioning system to keep all those servers cool. Electricity will come from the center’s own substation built by Rocky Mountain Power to satisfy the 65-megawatt power demand. Such a mammoth amount of energy comes with a mammoth price tag—about $40 million a year, according to one estimate. 
En het is de NSA om twee dingen te doen:
Allereerst het verzamelen van zo veel mogelijk informatie van en over mensen die relevant kan zijn bij de bescherming van Amerikaanse belangen (in de ruimste zin):
Once the communications are intercepted and stored, the data-mining begins. “You can watch everybody all the time with data- mining,” Binney says. Everything a person does becomes charted on a graph, “financial transactions or travel or anything,” he says. Thus, as data like bookstore receipts, bank statements, and commuter toll records flow in, the NSA is able to paint a more and more detailed picture of someone’s life.
Dat is nog voor de hand liggend en behoort eigenlijk niemand te verbazen. Het andere doel is nog enger.
Op dit moment kun je redelijk veilig communiceren met behulp van encryptie. Als je je e-mail versleutelt met behulp van het AES-algoritme, dan is de kans dat iemand dat ongeautoriseerd kan lezen voorlopig miniem.
Uiteraard hebben geheime diensten er een hekel aan als andere hun berichten net zo goed (of beter) versleutelen dan zij zelf doen, dus doet de NSA alle moeite om het AES-algoritme te breken. Daar zijn twee dingen voor nodig: heel snelle computers, zodat je in zo kort mogelijke tijd alle mogelijke sleutels kunt uitproberen en een zo groot mogelijke hoeveelheid versleutelde berichten. Op basis daarvan kunnen computers op zoek gaan naar patronen om op die manier het algoritme te breken.
Als je de code eenmaal gebroken hebt, kun je, hopsakee, alle oude versleutelde berichten die je bewaard hebt, alsnog ontcijferen.
That, he notes, is where the value of Bluffdale, and its mountains of long-stored data, will come in. What can’t be broken today may be broken tomorrow. “Then you can see what they were saying in the past,” he says. “By extrapolating the way they did business, it gives us an indication of how they may do things now.” The danger, the former official says, is that it’s not only foreign government information that is locked in weaker algorithms, it’s also a great deal of personal domestic communications, such as Americans’ email intercepted by the NSA in the past decade.
Eng? Nogal.
Kunnen we er iets aan doen? Ik denk het niet...

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Backdoors en Bundestrojaner

Met dank aan EJK